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Bridging the Gap between Similarity and Causality: An 
Integrated Approach to Concepts 
Corinne L. Bloch-Mullins 
Department of Philosophy, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI 
Abstract 
A growing consensus in the philosophy and psychology of concepts is that while theories such as the prototype, 
exemplar, and theory theories successfully account for some instances of concept formation and application, 
none of them successfully accounts for all such instances. I argue against this ‘new consensus’ and show that the 
problem is, in fact, more severe: the explanatory force of each of these theories is limited even with respect to the 
phenomena often cited to support it, as each fails to satisfy an important explanatory desideratum with respect to 
these phenomena. I argue that these explanatory shortcomings arise from a shared assumption on the part of 
these theories, namely, they take similarity judgements and application of causal knowledge to be discrete 
elements in a theory of concepts. I further propose that the same assumption carries over into alternative theories 
offered by proponents of the new consensus: pluralism, eliminativism, and hybrid theories. I put forth a sketch of 
an integrated model of concept formation and application, which rejects this shared assumption and satisfies the 
explanatory desiderata I discuss. I suggest that this model undermines the motivation for hybrid, pluralist, and 
eliminativist accounts of concepts.  
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1 Introduction 
Over the last few decades, three theories have dominated the philosophical and psychological 
literature on concepts: the prototype theory, the exemplar theory, and the theory theory.1 The 
prototype theory maintains that a concept is a body of statistical knowledge about the 
properties of the members of a class (Posner and Keele [1968]; Rosch and Mervis [1975]). 
The exemplar theory argues that it is a body of knowledge about the properties of individual 
members of a class (Medin and Schaffer [1978]; Nosofsky [1986]). I refer to these two views 
as the similarity-based approaches (see discussion in Medin [1989]). Lastly, the theory theory 
asserts that the concept of a class stores knowledge that is explanatory of the properties of the 
members of the class (Carey [1985]; Murphy and Medin [1985]; Gelman and Markman [1986]; 
Keil [1989]). While proponents of the three theories differ in their views on the structure and 
function of concepts, they accept the traditional assumption that all concepts share a general 
common structure and that a single model could, in principle, be developed, which would 
account for the formation and application of all concepts. However, despite an accumulation of 
a large amount of data, none of these approaches has succeeded in formulating such a model. 
As a result, a growing number of authors have argued that while each of these theories of 
concepts is able to account for a range of empirical phenomena related to the formation and 
use of concepts, no single theory has been successful in accounting for all, or even most, of 
these phenomena (Piccinini and Scott [2006]; Machery [2009], [2014]; Weiskopf [2009]). 
In accord with this view, which I refer to as the ‘new consensus’,2 several solutions have been 
offered: hybrid, pluralist, and eliminativist theories of concepts. Hybrid theories of concepts 
maintain that each category is represented by a single concept, and every concept is 
comprised of several distinct parts (for instance, a theory part and an exemplar part). These 
parts store different types of information about the members of the category (Rips et al. [1973]; 
Smith et al. [1974]; Osherson and Smith [1981]; Anderson and Betz [2001]). Pluralist theories 
argue that concepts are not of a single kind. Rather, there are multiple kinds of concepts (such 
as prototype concepts, exemplar concepts, and theory concepts). Consequently, no single 
theory—not even the hybrid theory—can be formulated to explain the formation and 
application of concepts (Piccinini and Scott [2006]; Machery [2009], [2014]; Weiskopf [2009]). 
Finally, eliminativism accepts the above pluralist position, and further maintains that we should 
dispose of the very concept of concept. Instead of studying concepts, psychologists should 
study, for example, prototypes, exemplars, and theories (Machery [2009], [2014]).3 
I argue against the new consensus, and maintain that philosophers and psychologists have 
mischaracterized the problem. The problem is not merely that each of the homogeneous 
theories of concepts discussed above accounts for some, but not all, instances of concept 
formation and application.4 Rather, the issue is more severe: the explanatory force of each of 
these theories is limited, even with respect to the phenomena often used to support it. This is 
because, while these theories provide useful insights about certain aspects of these 
phenomena, they each fail to accommodate an important explanatory desideratum with 
respect to these phenomena. In other words, the difficulty is not just with the scope of the 
empirical phenomena that each theory explains, but also with the depth of the explanations 
each theory provides.5 I show that an understanding of this problem gives rise to an integrated 
model of concepts, which resolves it.6 
In Section 2, I discuss the similarity-based theories of concepts: prototype and exemplar 
theories. I argue that without incorporating causal knowledge into the model, these theories do 
not accommodate what I term the ‘selection desideratum’. In Section 3, I discuss the theory-
based theories, and argue that without incorporating a notion of similarity, these theories do 
not accommodate what I term the ‘range desideratum’. In Section 4, I propose a solution in the 
form of a highly integrated model of categorization, which resolves the explanatory and 
conceptual difficulties I discuss. I suggest that the model undercuts the motivation, framed by 
the new consensus, for hybridist, pluralist, and eliminativist models. 
First, however, something needs to be said about scope of this article, and the purpose of my 
discussion of empirical data and experimental protocols. I do not attempt to discuss all theories 
of concepts, and all the empirical phenomena that are relevant to a model of concepts (not 
even all the phenomena that are relevant to the model I sketch in Section 4). Rather, the 
empirical data and experimental protocols I discuss specifically target the central assumption 
of the new consensus. This assumption, which provides motivation for a specific kind of 
hybridism, pluralism, or eliminativism, is that each of the homogeneous theories discussed 
above explains some phenomena very well, but that none explains all. In response, my 
strategy is to take a ‘flagship phenomenon’—an empirical phenomenon that the theory is taken 
as particularly successful in explaining—for each of the homogeneous theories and show that 
there are explanatory gaps even in the theory’s account of such a phenomenon. For similarity-
based approaches, I discuss studies that show, for example, that categorization tracks 
judgements about typicality. And for theory-based approaches, I discuss studies that show that 
categorization is influenced by judgements about causal structure. Thus, the data I discuss are 
not meant to provide empirical proof for the model I advocate (even though I hold that the data 
are compatible with it). Instead, they are used as illustrative devices to point out conceptual 
difficulties in each of the homogeneous theories discussed here. 
2 The Similarity-Based Approach and the Importance of Theory 
2.1 The similarity-based approach 
Within the similarity-based approach, the two dominant theories are prototype theories and 
exemplar theories. According to prototype theories, the concept of a class is a prototype—a 
body of statistical knowledge about the properties of the members of this class (Posner and 
Keele [1968]; Rosch and Mervis [1975]; Smith et al. [1988]; Smith and Minda [2002]). For 
example, one’s concept cat would include properties such as ‘has fur’, ‘purrs’, and so forth. In 
order to determine whether a target, say Sylvester, is a cat, one calculates the similarity 
between Sylvester and the cat prototype. According to exemplar theories, concepts are sets of 
exemplars, which are bodies of knowledge about the properties of individual members of a 
class (Medin and Schaffer [1978]; Nosofsky [1986]). For example, one’s concept cat may 
include representations of one’s own cat, of the neighbours’ cat, and so forth. In order to 
determine whether Sylvester is a cat, one calculates the similarity between Sylvester and the 
cat exemplar(s) one had previously encountered and stored in memory. The prototype and the 
exemplar theories hold that the categorization of a target as a member of a class depends on 
the computation of its similarity to the prototype or the exemplar, respectively. Thus, while 
there are interesting differences between prototype and exemplar theories (and the various 
versions of each), I refer to them collectively as the similarity-based theories, and contrast 
them with the theory theory. (For further discussion, see Medin [1989]; Rosch [1999b].) 
The various versions of the similarity-based approach have been taken as successfully 
explanatory of a range of empirical phenomena (for review, see Laurence and Margolis [1999]; 
Murphy [2002]; Margolis and Laurence [2004]; Machery [2009]). For example, a prototype of a 
category is experimentally reconstructed by asking subjects to list features of particulars 
belonging to members of that category. Subjects rate instances that share a lot of properties 
with other members of a category as better examples of that category than they do instances 
with fewer such properties (Rosch and Mervis [1975]). Such instances are more likely to be 
classified as members of a category and are categorized faster than non-typical ones (Rosch 
and Mervis [1975]; Hampton [1979]). Among the evidence supporting the exemplar theory is 
the finding that previously experienced items are more easily classified than new items, even 
when they have the same degree of typicality (for a review, see Nosofsky [1992]). Additionally, 
new items that are similar to previously encountered category members are categorized faster 
than items that are less similar to old stimuli, even when they are farther from the category’s 
prototype (Medin and Schaffer [1978]). 
2.2 The selection desideratum 
The similarity-based approach, however, faces an explanatory challenge. Similarity is not 
absolute—it must always be considered with respect to a particular set of properties (see 
Goodman [1972]; Medin [1989]). As Medin ([1989], pp. 1473–4) pointed out:  
[…] a zebra and a barberpole would be more similar than a zebra and a horse if the feature 
‘striped’ had sufficient weight […] attempts to describe category structure in terms of similarity 
will prove useful only to the extent that one specifies which principles determine what is to 
count as a relevant property and which principles determine the importance of particular 
properties. 
Without such principles, a similarity-based theory is faced with what Machery ([2009]) calls the 
‘selection problem’. Accordingly, one desideratum of a similarity-based approach is that it be 
able to account for the way in which one chooses the individual features that serve as the 
basis for categorization. In line with Machery, I refer to this as the ‘selection desideratum’. 
Similarity-based approaches have attempted to accommodate the selection desideratum by 
taking the effects of the entire stimuli set into account. When the relevant features for similarity 
judgements are not specified, they are often inferred from the stimulus context—the set of 
objects under consideration (Torgerson [1965]; Tversky [1977]; Goldstone et al. [1997]). 
Different versions of similarity-based theories have incorporated the effect of stimulus context 
into their models in different ways. Some have suggested that basic categories are formed in a 
manner that maximizes both category resemblance and cue-validity of the properties of the 
particulars in the category (Rosch [1999a]) (I refer to this as the ‘maximization principle’). Cue-
validity of property y is the probability that an object belongs to a category X if it has the 
property y—for example, the probability that Sylvester is an instance of cat if he has fur. A 
property will have high cue-validity if particulars within the category have it and particulars in 
the contrast class (the class of items that the category is distinguished from) do not. For 
example, the cue-validity of ‘has fur’ for cats would be high if contrasted only with birds, but low 
if contrasted only with dogs. Thus cue-validity is one way of taking into account the effects of 
the set of particulars under consideration on the selection of features for similarity 
judgements.7 In what follows, I use the term ‘set of particulars under consideration’ (hereafter 
SOP) instead of the narrower term ‘stimulus context’, to reflect the idea that such effects are 
not necessarily limited to the set of particulars one is currently exposed to.8 
The incorporation of SOP effects into similarity-based models allows them to partially account 
for the selection of the relevant ‘respects’ for similarity judgements. Importantly, these and 
other adjustments—which take into account the typicality of properties in the target class and 
in contrast classes, their salience, their ‘perceptibility’, and so on—work to the extent that they 
rely on an assumption about the nature of the perceived world, namely, that it is carved at the 
joints in a manner that gives rise to the formation of a unique division into categories. Rosch’s 
working assumption, for example, is that ‘in the perceived world, information-rich bundles of 
perceptual and functional attributes occur that form natural discontinuities, and that basic cuts 
in categorization are made at these discontinuities’ (Rosch [1999a], p. 192; see also Rosch 
[1973]).9 
The assumption that the perceived world is ‘carved at the joints’ in a way that gives rise to a 
unique system of classification is problematic. Studies have shown, for example, that the 
fundamental taxonomic rank chosen by classifiers depends upon factors such as expertise 
(Tanaka and Taylor [1991]) and cultural factors (Dougherty [1978]). Moreover, classification 
based only on the maximization principle does not result in stable categories. The early 
numerical taxonomists attempted to classify organisms in a theory-free, inductive method. In 
order to calculate similarity, they used—in equal weights—all of the organisms’ legitimate 
biological features (Hull [1988]; this example is also discussed in Griffiths [1997], p. 178).10 
There seemed to be an indefinite number of ways to subdivide organisms into features, and 
without any selection criteria, all subdivisions were equally plausible. Adding the maximization 
principle into a similarity-based model is insufficient to accommodate the selection 
desideratum.11 
Of course, it is not necessary for a similarity-based approach to assume that there is only one 
way to carve up the perceived world (or the perceived SOP) that results in maximized in-
category similarity and inter-category difference. In fact, Rosch herself concedes that with 
respect to some categories, the classification system is not completely fixed by our biology, but 
is also influenced by an individual’s culture and language (Rosch [1975b]). The present point is 
that if there are two or more ways to carve up the same perceived world, then a theory of 
concepts based solely on similarity judgements would be unable to explain why we prefer one 
classification to another.12 
2.3 Causal knowledge as satisfying the selection desideratum 
In order to satisfy the selection desideratum, a model should incorporate additional elements, 
such as the goal of classification and background knowledge (see discussion in Medin et al. 
[1993]). For example, people form categories for the purpose of goal-relevant inferences 
(Holland et al. [1989]). Therefore, it may be expected that goals would affect the selection of 
relevant respects of similarity, thus directly influencing similarity judgements. Barsalou ([1982]) 
found that, for ad hoc categories (such as ‘things that can float’, ‘can be a pet’), exposure to 
the name of the category, which conveys information about the use or function of the items in 
the category, increases the similarity rating for pairs of items belonging to the category. 
Discussing the various factors that may be packed under the term ‘background knowledge’ 
and that may affect the selection of the relevant features for similarity judgements is beyond 
the scope of this article. Here, my focus is specifically on causal knowledge. 
Causal knowledge affects the selection of features for similarity ratings and for categorization. 
Ahn et al. ([2000], [2002]) found, for example, that causally fundamental features were more 
important than causally superficial ones for various category-related tasks, including 
goodness-of-exemplar ratings, free-sorting, similarity judgements, categorization, and 
sensitivity to feature correlations. One might point out that people often categorize without 
having much causal knowledge. Thus it might seem that while causal knowledge affects the 
selection of the relevant properties in some cases of categorization, it may not affect the 
selection in all cases. It is not required, however, that one has all the relevant background 
knowledge to select the relevant properties for similarity judgements and categorization. 
Missing elements—including causally fundamental features—are often inferred from other 
features, from the subject’s general background knowledge, or from analogy with other 
domains, and these affect categorization (Medin and Ortony [1989]; Rehder and Kim [2009]). 
Additionally, one’s theory about the general domain may lead one to selectively focus on some 
properties. This suggestion is supported by the findings that functional features are important 
in classification of artefacts (Wisniewski [1995]) and biological kinds (Lombrozo and Rehder 
[2012]). Therefore, even minimal knowledge about the targets would enable causal 
considerations to factor into similarity judgements and classification. 
I have argued that in similarity-based theories, the constraints imposed by the maximization 
principle do not accommodate the selection desideratum, and that additional factors, such as 
causal knowledge, should be added to accommodate it. It might be objected that even if, for 
some sets of objects (such as species categories), there are two (or more) alternative 
classifications that satisfy the maximization principle, there are at least some simpler cases for 
which only one classification achieves such maximization when all properties are given equal 
weights. In such cases, selection of specific properties is not required, and classification can 
be explained by appeal to overall similarity. Therefore, it may be argued, the selection 
desideratum is not central to a general theory of concepts. 
In response, it should be noted that even in cases we might take as much simpler than 
biological classification, one is unlikely to weigh all properties equally (consider, for example, 
the importance of shape versus colour in classification of kitchen tools). Given that factors 
such as background knowledge and goals affect the selection of relevant properties for 
similarity judgements and classification in various cases, there is no reason to assume that 
giving equal weights to the various relevant properties is one’s default position in classification. 
Attributing equal weights to all properties is, thus, one possible (although unlikely) outcome of 
a selection process. Even if there are cases in which all properties are considered in equal 
weights, the selection process still requires explanation. 
Moreover, if ‘simple’ means fewer properties, then it is not clear that there are any simple 
cases for categorization, as the list of possible properties for a given object is infinite. The 
issue is illustrated by Murphy and Medin ([1985], p. 292; see also Medin [1989]):  
Suppose that one is to list the attributes that plums and lawnmowers have in common in 
order to judge their similarity. It is easy to see that the list could be infinite: Both weigh 
less than 10,000 kg (and less than 10,001 kg …), both did not exist 10,000,000 years 
ago (and 10,000,001 years ago …), both cannot hear well, both can be dropped, both 
take up space, and so on. Likewise, the list of differences could be infinite. 
If the list of possible properties for each object is infinite, then there are no simple cases that 
give rise to overall similarity judgements. What counts as a relevant property, therefore, must 
be somehow constrained. The similarity-based approach may provide some structural 
constraints, based on principles of cognitive economy (for example, a property should apply to 
many but not all particulars) in addition to the maximization principle.13 However, as Smith and 
Medin ([1981], pp. 15–18) point out, these constraints are not sufficient, and it seems that the 
most important criterion for what counts as a relevant property for similarity judgements is that 
the property is used as input for categorization processes. If this is the case, explaining 
categorization purely in terms of similarity is circular. Similarity alone cannot satisfy the 
selection desideratum, which is warranted even in so-called simple cases.14 
The above discussion is not meant to provide empirical support for the idea that similarity 
alone could not satisfy the selection desideratum. Rather, the discussion is meant to 
demonstrate the conceptual difficulty with the traditional notion of similarity, if such a notion is 
to be explanatory of the structure, formation, and use of concepts. The explanatory force of the 
similarity-based approach is limited, even with respect to the phenomena that are taken to 
support it.15 I suggest, accordingly, that the criticism that models that are based on similarity 
alone can only explain some of the phenomena related to concepts is not strong enough. 
Rather, even with respect to the empirical phenomena that are often used to support them 
(such as categorization judgements that track typicality ratings), the explanations provided by 
these models fall short of satisfying the selection desideratum. In order to satisfy it, models of 
concept formation and application should include the effects of factors such as goals and 
background knowledge on the selection of relevant properties (and correlations of properties) 
for similarity judgements. 
In the following section, I examine whether classification (and other related tasks) can be 
explained solely within the framework of a competing approach, the theory theory, which relies 
heavily on the use of causal knowledge. I conclude that while the notion of similarity (as 
traditionally conceived) is not sufficient to accommodate the selection desideratum for a theory 
of concepts, it should not be discarded and, in fact, by excluding similarity from its account, the 
theory theory fails to accommodate a different explanatory desideratum. This shortcoming is 
rooted in the same assumption made by the similarity-based theories, namely, that similarity 
judgements and causal knowledge should be taken as discrete elements in a theory of 
concepts. 
3 The Theory-Based Approach and the Importance of Similarity 
3.1 The theory-based approach 
According to the theory-based approach, the concept of a class stores knowledge that is 
explanatory of the properties of the members of the class, knowledge of laws, as well as 
causal, functional, and generic propositions. While various versions of the theory-based 
approach differ on the specifics of the categorization process, they generally agree that a 
target is taken to belong to a class if its properties are judged to be generated (or at least 
constrained) by the causal structure that characterizes the members of that class (Medin and 
Ortony [1989]; Sloman et al. [1998]; Rehder and Hastie [2001]; Rehder [2003b]).For example, 
one’s concept cat may include the theory that the genetic structure of cats is causally 
responsible for cats’ various properties. If one judges that Sylvester likely has the same causal 
structure as members of the category of cats, one will classify Sylvester as a cat.16 
The theory theory is often taken by proponents of the new consensus as successful in 
explaining the effect of causal knowledge on subjects’ classification decisions in tasks 
involving a small number of properties (see discussion in Machery [2009]). I argue, however, 
that taken solely on its own terms, the theory theory is limited even with respect to the 
phenomena that are often used to support it, as it does not satisfy what I call the range 
desideratum. I first consider a representative example from experiments used in support of the 
theory theory in order to illuminate the theory’s explanatory limitation. I argue that while the 
theory may explain how the properties relevant for categorization decisions are chosen, it does 
not explain how one determines whether a particular target shares these relevant properties to 
a sufficient degree (or what such a determination amounts to). In Section 3.3, I suggest that 
the missing element involves the application of similarity judgements. 
3.2 The range desideratum 
The experiments often invoked in support of the theory theory are usually composed of two 
stages: the first is a learning stage, in which subjects learn the causal relations among a few 
properties of members of a category. For example, Rehder taught subjects about a novel 
category, lake victoria shrimp. For members of this category, the property ‘high amounts of 
ACh neurotransmitter’ is causally related to other properties, such as ‘long lasting flight 
response’ (Rehder [2003a], [2003b]). After the learning stage comes the testing stage, in which 
subjects are presented with new targets, and are asked to perform various tasks, such as 
categorizations, goodness-of-exemplar rating, free-sorting tasks, or similarity ratings (for 
instance, Ahn et al. [2000]; Rehder [2003a], [2003b]). In the experiment described here, for 
example, subjects rated targets as good category members to the extent that their features 
manifested the expectations induced by the causal story provided to them (Rehder [2003a]). 
In these experiments, the properties provided to subjects are almost always binary ones—a 
target either has, or doesn’t have, property y. Property y can, of course, belong to a dimension 
that is potentially continuous in character (such as amounts of ACh), and even stand for a 
range of values (such as the property ‘high amounts of ACh neurotransmitter’, which 
presumably stands for a range of possible ACh levels).17 However, both in the learning stage 
and in the testing stage, participants are presented only with binary values for these 
dimensions: they are informed that members of the category (or a certain percentage of them) 
and, later, the target to be classified either possess a property or do not possess it. For 
example, particulars either have ‘high amounts of ACh neurotransmitter’ or they do not. As a 
result, during the testing stage, subjects effectively judge whether there is a sameness relation 
between the target and the representation of the category, with respect to each relevant 
property.18 
The problem is that there is no reason to suppose that this is how the comparison of features 
is performed in real-life categorizations and, in fact, there are reasons to suppose that, at least 
in many cases, it is not. As in the case of ACh levels, dimensions that are used for 
classification may receive multiple values. In such cases, there is no demand that the values 
exhibited by members of a category be identical. For example, it is not the case that a target 
must have an exact value of ACh levels, say 7.23 units, in order to have ‘high levels of ACh 
neurotransmitter’. Rather, there is a range of ACh level values that, when exhibited by the 
target, would be taken as sufficiently high. 
A theory that is able to account for how one determines the appropriate range of values for a 
causally relevant dimension would have the advantage of telling a fuller story about how we 
make classification decisions with respect to categories with causal structure. This is the range 
desideratum. Since the majority of empirical phenomena used in support of the theory theory 
comes from experiments that do not present subjects with ranges of possible values, such 
phenomena are silent with respect to the range desideratum. 
One might object that decisions about ranges of values for categories like lake victoria shrimp 
are outside the scope of categorization decisions made by a non-expert. True. But so is the 
classification of a particular kind of shrimp, and the consideration of ACh levels for that 
purpose. The above experiment, while using scientific categories and parameters, was meant 
to shed light on ‘everyday’ processes of classification. My point here is that for whatever 
dimensions one does take into account in classification, a theory of concepts should, ideally, 
be able to say something about how the appropriate ranges of values for these dimensions are 
chosen. To illustrate this, let us consider a toy example. Suppose one has the following causal 
theory about teenagers: 
 
A theory theory about the concept teenager could satisfy the selection desideratum (that is, 
explaining how one determines the relevant dimensions for classification). If one has no 
special access to the target’s age (or hormonal levels), one will use the dimensions ‘eye rolling’ 
and ‘door slamming’ for the purpose of categorization, because they are taken to be indicative 
of the deeper cause (if we apply Ahn et al. [2000]) or because they are taken to be indicative of 
a specific causal structure (if we apply Rehder [2003a], [2003b]).19 However, since there is no 
requirement that individuals belonging to teenager actually be identical with respect to any of 
the relevant dimensions, the range desideratum needs to be satisfied. The causal theory alone 
cannot satisfy it, since it does not tell us how one determines the relevant ranges of values for 
these dimensions (for instance, how forceful should the shutting of the door be, in order to be 
considered a slam? What is the required frequency of eye rolling one has to engage in, to be 
considered an eye roller?). A theory that is able to satisfy the range desideratum would better 
account for why one classifies Jack (three eye rolls per hour) as a teenager, but not Jill (one 
eye roll per hour).20 
3.3 Similarity as satisfying the range desideratum 
I argued that even in the case of causal categories, one has to know the range of acceptable 
values for the relevant dimension in order to perform classification. I further argued that the 
theory theory does not tell us how one determines this range, that is, it does not satisfy the 
range desideratum. Note, however, that to determine such a range of acceptable values is 
precisely to answer questions like: how similar do ACh levels of particulars have to be to each 
other in order for the particulars to be members of the category lake victoria shrimp?21 In other 
words, forming a range of acceptable values is a way by which one forms a similarity threshold 
for categorization decisions. Thus the comparison between the individual dimensions (and 
correlation among their values) of members (or potential members) of a category involves 
similarity judgements, even if causal knowledge affects the selection of the relevant 
dimensions.22 
The need to move beyond matching of binary properties was recognized by Waldmann et al. 
([1995], Experiment 2). In their study, subjects received causal explanations and then learned 
a category (such as a disease with various symptoms) through a categorization task with 
feedback. The dimensions used in the description of the targets were ‘body weight’ and ‘pallor’. 
This experiment is of interest because unlike most experiments with causally structured 
categories, dimensions were not given merely binary values such as yes/no or high/low. 
Instead, they were given one of four possible value brackets. For example, the four values for 
body weight were ‘slightly underweight’, ‘underweight’, ‘seriously underweight’, and ‘anorexic’. 
Subjects’ performance (as measured by the number of errors) was better when classifying 
targets whose causal structure were closer to that predicted by the causal story they had 
learned. Their performance in the task was graded, exhibiting sensitivity both to the values of 
the two dimensions and to the correlation between them. The significant point here is that once 
we accept that a relevant dimension is continuous, the notion of similarity becomes necessary 
for explaining how a causal representation is applied to specific targets that have different 
values along that dimension. It is essential to my view that similarity judgements are not 
restricted to perceptual features (Hahn and Chater [1997]; Hampton [1998]; Medin [1989]; 
Gärdenfors [2000]; Mazzone and Lalumera [2010]; Rheins [2011]). Similarity judgements can 
therefore be applied to various theoretical characteristics often featured in causal theories, 
including the causal relations themselves. 
Importantly, the present point relates to a view about what categorization entails. Namely, that 
even if we accept the view that category members share a causal structure, it does not entail 
the stronger commitment that people group things in categories because they take them as 
sharing some identical property (or an identical relation between properties). Even if we 
concede, for example, that people believe that all raccoons share the internal, causally 
fundamental property ‘having raccoon DNA’, and that they believe that raccoons are members 
of racoon in virtue of sharing this property, we are still not entitled to the strong claim that 
people classify raccoons in this way because they think that there is something identical about 
the DNA of all raccoons. We are only entitled to the weaker claim, that they classify raccoons 
in this way because they think there is something similar about the DNA of all raccoons. 
Because most experiments that are invoked in support of the causal theory use binary values, 
they are silent with respect to the stronger claim. Given that the sort of causal properties 
subjects are often asked to consider are potentially continuous (such as levels of ACh), and 
given what we may reasonably assume about non-experts’ general knowledge about such 
properties (for instance, that exact levels of neurotransmitter vary among particulars of the 
same species), the stronger claim, it seems to me, is not warranted. The same goes for non-
scientific concepts. One may very well have a causal theory for teenager. But this does not 
pose the requirement that to classify Jack and Jill as teenagers, one must believe that they 
share an identical age, or an identical hormonal level, or that the causal chain between their 
hormone levels and their door slamming is identical. What Jack and Jill share, and what 
various instances of lake victoria shrimp share, is a similar causal structure.23 
Four objections can be made here. The first is that one may receive the range of values from 
experts (for instance, scientists can tell us what the proper range for ACh levels is for lake 
victoria shrimp). In this case, one can apply the concept to a target without engaging in any 
similarity judgements. Furthermore, experts themselves often use their causal knowledge to 
determine the appropriate range of values for a given dimension.24 I agree with both points. 
However, given my view, just discussed, on what categorization entails (and what similarity is), 
I would argue that for both the expert and the non-expert, grasping that there is such a range 
of values among members of a category amounts to grasping that the relation between 
members of a category with respect to the relevant dimension is that of similarity. Therefore, 
even if the determination of the range of values for the relevant dimension is performed by 
experts, and even if this determination is guided by causal considerations, grasping a concept 
requires at least the implicit grasp that members of a category stand in a relation of similarity to 
one another. 
The second objection is that with my emphasis on ‘acceptable range’, my characterization may 
be taken to imply that one must have an explicit knowledge of the range of values in order to 
make the classification, when in fact people rarely do. My argument, however, does not 
necessitate such knowledge (for example, it is not necessary that one has an exact cut-off 
value for how many eye rolls per hour are required for an individual to be taken as an eye 
roller). Knowledge of the proper range is often implicit, and fuzzy borders for the range of 
acceptable values may lead to fuzzy categories. Note, moreover, that any model of 
categorization that involves similarity judgements will have to incorporate some mechanism for 
determining how similar is ‘similar enough’, and there is nothing in my suggestion that 
demands a higher degree of explicit knowledge or accuracy about where the cut-off point 
should be. 
A third, related objection is that my view may be taken to imply that the decision about whether 
a given target falls within the proper range of values, with respect to the relevant dimension is 
an all-or-nothing process. Similarity-based category judgements, however, often exhibit 
typicality effects (typical items are classified faster than non-typical items) (Rosch [1975a], 
[1999a]; Rosch and Mervis [1975]). My reply is that forming a range of acceptable values 
merely provides one with a mechanism of translating similarity judgements into ‘yes/no’ 
categorization decisions. Nothing in the account, however, precludes the various effects 
associated with similarity judgements themselves (for instance, it is perfectly consistent with 
my view that it may take us longer to classify targets that are closer to the range’s extreme 
than those that are placed in the middle of the range, with respect to the relevant dimensions). 
A fourth objection might go as follows: I suggested that the process of categorization based on 
similarity with respect to each casually relevant dimension can be explained as a two-step 
process. First, during the initial formation of the category, one forms a range of acceptable 
values. Then, in order to make a decision about the classification of target T, one judges 
whether T’s properties fall within that range. This, it may be argued, disregards the flexible 
nature of similarity judgements, which may change as one is exposed to additional targets. It 
has been shown that the similarity rating for two targets, even when confined to a single 
dimension, is influenced by the presentation of a third target that serves as a foil. For example, 
two small black disks, presented along with a large black disk, were judged to be more similar 
as the size of large disk increased (King and Atef-Vahid [1986]). This means that what one 
takes as the range of acceptable values for a dimension might change as one encounters new 
targets. In response, I’d like to point out that my suggestion allows for such modifications of 
similarity judgements, and entails that these will be translated into categorization decisions 
through a change in the range of allowable values within the relevant dimension.25 As I discuss 
in Section 4.1, there is no requirement that the borders of the range be rigid. 
I have argued that the experiments often appealed to by proponents of the theory theory 
require participants to make sameness judgements with respect to dimensions with binary 
values. Such experiments do not enable researchers to test for similarity judgements with 
respect to individual features or relations used in categorization. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that proponents of the theory theory often consider similarity judgements to be irrelevant for 
categorization or for category-based inferences performed in the presence of causal 
knowledge (Rehder and Hastie [2001]; Rehder [2006]). Since the dimensions that are used in 
actual categorization and category-based inferences often receive non-binary values, I argue 
that a theory that explains how the proper range of values is determined would be 
advantageous. I further suggest that the notion of similarity may facilitate such an explanation, 
even in the case of categories whose members share a causal structure. 
Again, this discussion of classification decisions is not meant to be exhaustive of the tasks that 
involve the use of concepts or the phenomena that a theory of concepts aims to explain. 
Rather, the discussion is meant to highlight a conceptual difficulty with the idea that non-
identical particulars can be classified as members of a category without the use of similarity 
judgements.26 This difficulty was demonstrated by showing the explanatory limitation of the 
theory, even with respect to phenomena that are taken to support it. If I am right, then the 
diagnosis of the new consensus—that the theory theory is unsatisfactory because it only 
accounts for some of the category-based phenomena—is not strong enough. Rather, the 
theory theory, when it does not incorporate similarity judgements, falls short of accommodating 
the range desideratum, and therefore does not provide a satisfactory account of categories 
whose members share a causal structure. 
4 An Integrated Approach to Concepts 
In Section 2, I argued that similarity-based approaches do not satisfy the selection 
desideratum unless they admit theoretical considerations into their models. In Section 3, I 
argued that theory-based approaches do not satisfy the range desideratum unless they admit 
similarity judgements into their models. I now outline an integrated model of concept formation 
and application that arises from this characterization of the problem and satisfies both 
desiderata. I suggest that the model undercuts the motivation for the hybridism, pluralism, or 
eliminativism formulated by the new consensus.27 I should emphasize that the suggested 
model should not be taken to be exact or comprehensive. Rather, it provides a framework 
within which the above discussion can be understood and integrated. In Section 4.2, I contrast 
my theory with hybrid theories of concepts, in order to explicate the strong sense of integration 
to which my view is committed. 
4.1 An integrated model 
The suggested model is illustrated in Figure 1, which depicts the initial formation of a category 
and the subsequent categorization of a new target. Since the model integrates data discussed 
in some detail in Sections 2 and 3, in what follows, I only briefly relate the elements of the 
model to some of the previously discussed data, and then discuss a number of implications. 
As discussed in Section 2, several factors affect the selection of dimensions for similarity 
judgements (Arrow 1 in Figure 1). First, the distribution of features among the SOP (contrast 
among particulars, perceptual salience of certain properties) affects the selection of features 
for similarity judgements (Rosch [1999a]). Goals and causal knowledge also affect the features 
used in similarity judgements (Barsalou [1982]; Medin et al. [1993]; Ahn et al. [2000]). As 
discussed in Section 3, the dimensions selected for similarity judgements may include causal 
relations (accordingly, what is judged to be similar between Jack and Jill is, I suggest, not only 
their age and their hormone levels, but also the causal chain between their age and their 
hormone levels). The involvement of causal knowledge in categorization is therefore not 
limited to the selection of dimensions for similarity judgements (in which case one might argue 
that causal knowledge is, in some sense, external to such judgements); rather, causal relations 
are, in part, what similarity judgements are about. 
As discussed in Section 3, the ranges of acceptable values for dimensions and correlations 
that are deemed causally relevant are determined (Arrow 2 in Figure 1). The ranges should 
maximize in-category similarity and inter-category differences, as suggested by Rosch 
([1999a]), with the additional stipulation that this maximization is not absolute, but is relative to 
the selected dimensions. This range is dynamic, and depends on the various properties of the 
SOP. The model sketched here is silent with respect to the psychological mechanism that 




An integrated model for classification and categorization. Initial formation of a category, and the following 
categorization of new targets are described. Arrows indicate causal connections; grey arrows indicate feedback 
loops. 
After the ranges of the relevant dimensions are formed, the relevant properties of a new target 
are compared to the ranges of acceptable values (Arrow 3 in Figure 1), and a classification 
decision is made (Arrow 4 in Figure 1). The model, however, emphasizes the dynamic 
structure of concepts (and similarity judgements). Along the lines of Gärdenfors’s ([2000], 
Section 4.5) account of concept learning, the process described here is not one-directional, nor 
is it strictly divided into a category-formation stage and a category-application stage (see 
feedback loops Arrows 5 and 6 in Figure 1). Given the effect of context on the selection of 
relevant respects for similarity (see discussion in Section 2.2), a presentation of a new target 
may, for example, affect the selection of relevant dimensions for similarity calculation. 
Additionally, in accordance with the anchor-range effect (King and Atef-Vahid [1986]), a new 
target may alter the ranges of the appropriate values with respect to the dimensions deemed 
relevant for similarity calculations, thus changing the resolution of the similarity judgements. 
It is likely that additional feedback loops should be added to the model. For example, the 
formation of a mental category (or the labelling of that category) may shift one’s attention 
towards new dimensions and affect similarity judgements (for discussion of some relevant 
phenomena, see Collins and Olson [2014]). Additionally, the formation of a new category may 
contribute to the development of one’s theoretical knowledge about members of the category 
by, for instance, facilitating inductive inference (see, for example, discussion in Smith [1989]). 
This theoretical knowledge may, in turn, affect the selection of relevant dimensions, leading to 
a new classification. Thus, the suggested model highlights a view of concepts as dynamic 
constructs. I should point out, however, that despite the emphasis on these dynamic features, 
the model does not take concepts to be constructs in working memory, created on the fly.28 
While the debate on the stability of concepts is outside the scope of this article, it should be 
noted that one may consistently hold that concepts are fairly stable constructs, stored in long-
term memory, yet that they may change as new knowledge comes to light. The current model 
may accommodate both approaches.29 
The model proposed here takes a broad view of similarity. As I point out, similarity need not be 
merely perceptual, and can be calculated across abstract features and relations (Hahn and 
Chater [1997]; Hampton [1998]; Gärdenfors [2000]; Medin [1989]; Mazzone and Lalumera 
[2010]; Rheins [2011]). It may appear that in painting such a broad picture of similarity, I have 
turned the idea of similarity into a vacuous one—similarity just is anything that would account 
for putting things in the same category, whether it’s perceptual or more abstract (see 
discussion in Medin et al. [1993]; Goldstone [1994]; Sloman and Rips [1998]). As discussed 
above, however, making a similarity judgement is a process in which two (or more) things are 
compared against a (provided or postulated) background that serves as a foil, and a 
judgement of similarity requires the specification (either implicitly or explicitly) of relevant 
dimensions for comparison. The term ‘similarity’, therefore, imposes specific demands on what 
a similarity-based account of concepts must explain: it must account for the effect of both SOP 
and background knowledge on the selection of the relevant dimensions for similarity 
judgements, and the determination of the proper ranges for these dimensions. Moreover, the 
view of similarity incorporated into the current model leads to specific predictions that may be 
tested empirically. The model predicts, for example, that the objects that serve as the foil in 
categorization decisions would affect both the selection of relevant dimensions for 
categorization and the ranges of values along these dimensions, and that these effects would 
be observed even in categories in which causal knowledge plays a central role. 
4.2 The integrated theory versus hybrid theories of concepts 
Some authors who have accepted the new consensus have tried to salvage the concept of the 
concept by appealing to hybrid theories. Various hybrid models have combined elements from 
several homogeneous theories. In what follows, I briefly discuss some of these, and argue that 
since traditional hybrid approaches do not identify some of the explanatory issues at stake, 
they also fall short of resolving them. I suggest that the integrated approach has explanatory 
advantages over traditional hybrid theories. I end by comparing my view to a couple of highly 
integrated hybrid models, spelling out the strong sense of integration that is implied by my 
view. 
Versions of hybrid theories differ from each other in what they take as the elements that 
compose concepts, and in the ways they take these elements to be connected and 
coordinated. Anderson and Betz ([2001]), for example, suggested a cognitive architecture in 
which elements from exemplar-based models and from rule-based models are mixed to 
produce classification behaviour. In their hybrid model of categorization, the system selects 
which of these strategies to employ depending on the task at hand. Other approaches have 
suggested that a concept is a single representation containing a core component, such as a 
definition, and stereotypical features (Rips et al. [1973]; Smith et al. [1974]; Osherson and 
Smith [1981]). According to such models, the stereotypical features are used for quick 
categorization decisions, and the core is utilized when a decision cannot be made based on 
stereotypical features alone, as well as for additional purposes, such as making inferences. 
My contention is that by misconstruing the problem, such hybrid theories—like the pluralist and 
the eliminativist approaches—have missed the solution. If we assume that each homogeneous 
theory successfully accounts for some, but not all, phenomena, a model that treats these 
theories as discrete elements that are differentially activated in various cognitive tasks may 
seem promising. But if, as I argue here, each of these homogeneous theories does not satisfy 
an important explanatory desideratum even with respect to the empirical phenomena that 
serve to support it, then hybrid theories that incorporate elements from these theories may 
inherit the same explanatory challenges faced by the homogeneous approaches. The 
core/exemplar model, for example, faces two explanatory difficulties. For quick categorization 
decisions performed using the stereotypical features, the difficulty in accounting for the 
selection of features remains. For slower decisions based on ‘core properties’, the question 
remains as to how a set of dimensions—however limited it may be—is compared among 
particulars. In contrast to the hybrid approaches, the integrated model does not face such 
difficulties, as it accommodates both the selection and the range desiderata. 
Of course, not all hybrid approaches argue that a single element is activated at a time. Rice 
([2014]), for example, argues that (different combinations of) the various elements of concepts, 
which store different types of knowledge, are co-activated and integrated before the 
information is processed by any higher cognitive processes. Whether the specific hybrid 
concepts described by Rice are immune to the above criticism would depend on which 
elements are activated and the specific ways in which they are connected (or merged). 
Still, there is an important difference between my approach and Rice’s, which pertains to what 
we take concepts to be. To see this difference, it would help to consider the different ways in 
which our approaches respond to a challenge put forth by Machery ([2009]).30 Machery points 
out that a traditional hybrid theory, in which the system selects a single element to be used in a 
given task, is not distinguished from pluralist approaches to concepts. The system in the 
core/exemplar hybrid model, for example, utilizes, at any given moment, elements either from 
the exemplar-based model or the rule-based model, but it does not use the two together. So 
why should we say that we have one concept with two modes of deployment, rather than two 
concepts? The problem does not seem to be alleviated by models in which a concept is taken 
to be a single representation comprising several distinct components that are differentially 
activated. The difficulty simply shifts, and we may then ask in what way the different elements 
comprise a single representation. In response to Machery, Rice ([2014]) points out that his own 
account provides a clear individuation criterion for concepts: the various elements should be 
taken as comprising a single concept because they are linked together and integrated before 
being used as input for the same cognitive process. 
My own view differs from Rice’s in that I do not take concepts to be constituted by several 
‘parts’, which store distinct types of knowledge and which functionally interact (thus, my view is 
not vulnerable to Machery’s particular criticism concerning concept individuation).31 In other 
words, I do not suggest that knowledge about similarity and causal knowledge ‘come together’ 
in the process of concept formation or activation. It is crucial to my account that similarity 
judgements are very broad, and apply not only to simple dimensions but also to complex 
dimensions including causal relations among properties. Accordingly, causal knowledge not 
only serves in the selection of the relevant dimensions for similarity judgements, but it also 
figures into what is being compared in these very judgements. To go back to a previous 
example, Jack and Jill are similar not only with respect to ‘hormone level’, ‘eye rolling’, and 
‘door slamming’, but also with respect to the causal mechanisms that link these dimensions. 
There is no sense, therefore, in which one’s knowledge about Jack and Jill, qua teenagers, 
can be understood as comprising discrete, similarity-based knowledge items and causally 
based knowledge items. To have the concept teenager is to take Jack and Jill (and others) as 
members of a category by virtue of their similarities with respect to specific dimensions and 
with respect to the causal links between those dimensions. 
The present view may be compatible with Vicente and Martinez Manrique’s ([2016]) approach 
to hybrids. They argue for a hybrid framework that requires that the various elements of the 
concept are activated concurrently and have some functional significance for the task at hand. 
Unlike traditional hybrid models, they are not committed to the idea that the elements are 
‘semi-separable in the quasi-modular sense’ (Manrique and Manrique [2016], p. 75). To the 
extent that a hybrid theory does not require such compartmentalization, the present account 
may be taken as a version of a hybrid account in which causal and statistical knowledge is 
organized according to complex similarity relations.32 
5 Conclusion 
I argue here against the premise, shared by proponents of hybridism, pluralism, and 
eliminativism, that each of the homogeneous theories of concepts successfully explains some, 
but not all, of the phenomena involving concept formation and application. I argue, instead, 
that each of the homogeneous theories, when taken on its own terms, fails to accommodate an 
important explanatory desideratum, even with respect to the very phenomena often used to 
support it. I further suggested that these explanatory shortcomings arise from an assumption, 
shared by the homogeneous theories, that our knowledge about the similarities of category 
members and our knowledge about the causal relations among their properties are discrete 
knowledge items. I proposed a model of categorization, in which knowledge about causal 
relations and similarity are highly integrated. The model satisfies the two explanatory 
desiderata I discussed, and undercuts the motivation, framed by the new consensus, for 
pluralism, eliminativism, and traditional hybridism. 
1 For the purpose of this article, I am glossing over interesting differences between several 
versions of each of these approaches. 
2 Importantly, the new consensus, as I use the term here, does not refer to just any view that 
holds that the three theories discussed above should be rejected (indeed, the present 
article also rejects these theories, at least in their traditional construal). Rather, I use the 
term to refer to the particular motivation, described above, for holding that these 
theories should be rejected. 
3 This version of eliminativism, which develops out of pluralism about concepts, argues that 
prototypes, exemplars, and theories exist, but they do not belong to a single kind. It 
should be distinguished from the claim that there are no such stable mental constructs 
(for example, Casasanto and Lupyan [2015]). 
4 Throughout the article, I describe prototype, exemplar, and theory theories as homogeneous, 
to be contrasted with hybrid, pluralist, and eliminativist theories of concepts. 
5 As one referee remarked, we cannot determine a priori which aspects of the phenomena will 
turn out to be relevant for a theory of concepts. It is possible that certain aspects will be 
explained by a mechanism that is distinct from concepts. I suggest, however, that if (as I 
propose below) a theory of concepts can be constructed, which accounts for these 
aspects of the phenomena, this should be taken as an advantage of that theory. 
6 I limit my discussion to prototype, exemplar, and theory theories, as they serve as the main 
targets of the pluralists and eliminativists approaches I discuss here. Therefore, I do not 
discuss other theories of concepts, such as embodied approaches, which hold that 
concepts are encoded perceptually. What I term the new consensus, then, should not 
be understood as a broad statement about the state of play in the field of concepts 
research, but rather as representing a view that has been gaining support among 
proponents of the amodal framework. 
I should point out, however, that some pluralists would be quite happy to add embodied 
approaches to their arsenal (see, for example, Rice [2014]). One criticism made against 
embodied approaches is that, while they may work well for concrete concepts, they do 
not properly explain how highly abstract concepts, such as justice, are grounded in 
perception (Mahon and Caramazza [2008]; for some proposed solutions, see Barsalou 
[1999]; Gibbs [2006]; Prinz [2005]). This does not pose a problem for pluralists who are 
willing to admit both embodied and amodal concepts into their accounts (see discussion 
in Dove [2009]). I do not address this type of pluralism here. Importantly, I distinguish 
between questions about the content of concepts and questions about their vehicle 
(Mahon [2015]; Weiskopf [2010]; see also Machery [2007]; Bloch-Mullins [2015]). The 
explanatory challenges I discuss here arise from issues about the content of concepts, 
and would therefore apply to embodied theories as well. For related reasons, I hold that 
the sketch I propose in Section 4 could accommodate embodied views of concepts, as 
well as amodal ones. While I hold that concepts contain both perceptual and non-
perceptual information, my view is silent with respect to whether this information is 
coded perceptually or non-perceptually. Due to limitation of space, I do not specifically 
address embodied approaches in this article. 
7 Tversky and Gati’s notion of the ‘diagnosticity of features’ works along the same lines 
(Tversky [1977]; Tversky and Gati [1978]). 
8 As recognized by the models discussed above, when it comes to concepts (rather than 
artificial categories produced for the purpose of an experiment), the set of particulars 
under consideration is not limited to the objects that one might be facing at a given 
moment. It also includes other particulars that a given category naturally contrasts with 
within one’s taxonomy (Rosch et al. [1976]). For example, since cats are usually placed 
in one’s taxonomy as contrasting with other animals, the cue validity for various 
properties of cats will be determined by contrasting them with the properties of dogs, 
birds, and so on, even if, at the moment the concept is used, one is not exposed to 
dogs. Similarly, since chairs are usually placed in one’s taxonomy as contrasting with 
other furniture, the cue validity of various properties of chairs will be determined by 
contrasting them with properties of sofas, tables, and so on. 
9 Note Rosch’s use of the term ‘perceived world’. She is not committed to the strong 
metaphysical assumption that such discontinuities exist ‘out there’, independently of us 
as perceivers. 
10 Of course, ‘legitimate biological features’ already implies some constraints. 
11 One might point out that similarity-based approaches need not make such a strong 
assumption about the perceived world. While the similarity-based approaches 
discussed here assume that concepts are stable across occasions and across 
individuals, not all similarity-based approaches must be committed to this assumption. 
Instead, they may take classification as strongly influenced by the specific ‘stimulus 
context’ at any given moment; that is, the SOP, in effect, may be much more localized. 
Such a model, then, only needs to assume that the localized SOP is ‘carved at the 
joints’, an assumption that may be easier to defend. I suggest, however, that even this 
more limited requirement is problematic, for reasons similar to those discussed in 
Section 2.3 for ‘simple classification’ cases. 
12 One might suggest that various contextual factors (specific goals, background knowledge, 
and so on) can explain such decisions. As will become clear, I am extremely 
sympathetic to this solution. My present point, however, is that a theory that is based 
solely on similarity, narrowly construed, cannot help itself to these resources. It must 
either appeal to separate mechanisms, distinct from concepts, or confine itself to SOP-
effects. Constructs such as ‘cue validity’ or ‘diagnosticity’ do the latter. 
13 The term ‘cognitive economy’ is borrowed from (Rosch [1999a], p. 190). 
14 I do not mean to suggest here that one cannot calculate similarity or form categories without 
causal knowledge. One can learn, of course, artificial perceptual categories for which 
causal knowledge is irrelevant (for example, Posner and Keele [1968]). However, while 
these works provide valuable insight into some aspects of similarity judgements and 
their role in categorization, they bypass, at least in part, the problem of selection, and 
therefore cannot provide us with the full explanation of how selection takes place in ‘real 
world’ classification. 
15 As will become clear in Section 4.2, the difficulty is inherited by other theories that take up 
the same narrow notion of similarity. 
16 One’s theory does not need to be elaborate, however. It is not even necessary that one 
know that genes exist. One only has to have a general sense that there is something 
causally fundamental in cats, which brings about the other common properties of cats 
(Medin and Ortony [1989]; Gelman [2005]; Carey [2009]). 
17 Hereafter, I use ‘dimensions’ to refer to variables (for example, colour), and ‘properties’ (or 
‘features’ or ‘attributes’) to refer to specific values (or ranges of values) along these 
dimensions (for example, red). 
18 I found Rheins’s ([2011]) article on the species concept helpful in thinking about this point, 
and more broadly, about the role of similarity in categories whose members share a 
causal structure. 
19 One might point out that in this toy example, knowing the target’s age would enable one to 
make a clear-cut classification decision without the need to rely on other, more 
superficial dimensions. However, one of the appealing features of the theory theory is 
that it purports to provide us with the mechanism by which we make classifications 
based on observable features, even when we are unable to observe the most causally 
fundamental feature in virtue of which particulars belong to the category. In these cases, 
the theory theory maintains, we use the causally superficial features to infer the 
presence of the underlying feature (see, for example, Rehder and Kim [2009]). Indeed, 
without the possibility for such causal inference, the theory theory would apply to a very 
limited range of categorization decisions. Therefore, in this example, I do not limit the 
discussion to the most causally fundamental feature. 
20 I do not mean to imply that one has to be able to attribute an exact range of numerical 
values to this dimension; I say more about this in Section 3.3. 
21 Rheins’s definition of similarity is helpful here. He takes similarity to be ‘the resemblance 
relationship that holds between two or more things (the “similars”) when their 
differences in some specific respect(s) are dwarfed by their differences to one or more 
dissimilar things (the “foil”)’ (Rheins [2011], p. 255). Accordingly, a concept based on 
similarity is the ‘grasp of a range of possible “measurements” along the relevant axes of 
variation, as contrasted against all other values that lie outside that range’ (p. 256). 
Beyond this notion of similarity, the present article makes no claims about how similarity 
is assessed (see discussion in Hahn and Chater [1997]). 
22 This is not to imply that causal considerations are irrelevant for determining the appropriate 
ranges of values within these dimensions—I address this point below. 
23 One might argue that since lake victoria shrimp is a natural kind while teenager is not, 
instances of the former but not the latter share an identical essence. But the present 
point is precisely that while there may be important differences between the two 
concepts (for example, with respect to the number of generalizations they support), the 
empirical findings that support the theory theory do not warrant the strong claim that 
classifiers believe that there is something identical about all members of lake victoria 
shrimp. 
24 I thank an anonymous referee for this point. 
25 See, in this context, the importance of the foil for the notion of similarity, discussed in 
Footnote 21. 
26 As will become clear in Section 4.2, the difficulty is inherited by other theories that take up a 
similarly flat view of the application of causal knowledge in categorization. 
27 It does not, however, serve as a direct argument against hybridism, pluralism, or 
eliminativism. 
28 For recent discussions see (Casasanto and Lupyan [2015]; Machery [2015]). 
29 For those who view concepts as constructs created on the fly, localized factors may carry 
more weight in the model than general ones. For example, SOP may become localized 
and much closer to the specific ‘stimulus context’, local goals will be emphasized over 
long-term cognitive goals, and so on. 
30 See also (Weiskopf [2009]). My aim here is not to evaluate the effectiveness of Rice’s 
approach in responding to Machery, but merely to use Machery’s objection to flesh out 
important differences between Rice’s approach and my own. 
31 My view is further distinguished from Rice’s in that (i) I do not argue that concepts are 
constructed on the fly, and (ii) I do not argue for pluralism. A discussion of the first point 
is outside the scope of this article (but see brief comments at the end of the previous 
section). With respect to the second point, my own view does not directly argue against 
pluralism. However, I argue against a specific motivation for pluralism, by suggesting 
that the new consensus has misconstrued the problem, and I propose that a proper 
construal of the problem gives rise to an alternative solution. 
32 As an anonymous referee pointed out, concept pluralists may admit my suggested model as 
one possible construct used in higher cognitive processes. Importantly, however, to the 
extent that the other constructs they allow require that we take similarity judgements 
and application of causal knowledge as discrete elements, their view is still vulnerable 
to the difficulties discussed above. 
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